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Abstract
Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour.
Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision
of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the as-
sociated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with
cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isola-
tion can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We
introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better un-
derstand this. Our analysis uncovers an intricate web of nuances that
demonstrate the attainable yet elusive nature of a unique outcome.
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1 Introduction
You receive an email from your boss stating that he must nominate exactly
two sta¤ as trade union representatives as soon as possible. All sta¤ would
like that someone represents them on the union, but the question is who? If
no-one else volunteers, or if at least two others volunteer, there is no sense in
you volunteering. If only one person volunteers then the outcome depends
on you. You click reply and hesitate... how do your colleagues choose?
The story illustrates the participation problem in the private provision of
discrete public goods. Grander scale examples might include international
economic agreements, climate treaties, open source software, and political
representation. A useful framework for analysing the issue is found in the
seminal work of Palfrey & Rosenthal (1984) (P&R). They identify two types
of equilibria, that where no-one participates and that where exactly those
needed for provision do so. This dichotomy exposes two fundamental prob-
lems, concerning e¢ ciency (since all individuals would be better o¤ with
provision than without) and coordination (since there are multiple provision
equilibria). The problems can neither be solved by evoking the renement
of strict equilibrium nor by using refunds, that is returning costs if there are
insu¢ cient participants. However, P&R show that taken together, these two
factors can achieve e¢ ciency: with refunds, all strict equilibria are e¢ cient.
The important insights above presume that individuals maximise mater-
ial payo¤s. But scholars argue that in the context of public goods provision it
is natural for additional motives such as reciprocity to come into play (Sug-
den 1984).1 Reciprocity can be modeled as the desire to be kind to those
who are kind to you and unkind to those who are unkind to you (Rabin
1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004 (D&K), Falk & Fischbacher 2006).
In settings where it is benecial that everyone contributes, the application
of reciprocity theory is straightforward and leads to conditional cooperation:
players desire to contribute increases as others contributions go up. Em-
pirical support for such behaviour has been provided (Keser & van Winden
2000, Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr 2001, Fischbacher & Gächter 2010) via
experimental public good games (Ledyard 1995). However, in discrete public
goods games it isnt useful, but rather wasteful, to contribute if many others
do so anyway, so the implications of reciprocity are not obvious. Will reci-
1Reciprocity is not the only important social preference in such environments. Makris
(2009) considers altruism and Rothenhäusler et al. (2013) a form of guilt.
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procity make it easier for you decide how to reply to your bossemail? Will it
solve the e¢ ciency and coordination problems? Answers require systematic
analysis.
We use the workhorse model of P&R and conceptualise reciprocity as
in the D&K model. Cost-sharing, where individuals reduce each others
cost-burden if the number of participants exceeds that needed for provision,
proves crucial. P&Rs insights are robust to reciprocity and cost-sharing,
taken individually. However, with both reciprocity and cost-sharing in the
picture, conclusions are dramatically di¤erent. There may exist a unique
e¢ cient rened equilibrium so the coordination problem can be solved. But
results on this potential are marvelously intricate, with possibilities as well
as dead ends in the form of multiplicity or non-existence.
To untangle structure, we introduce and study new network notions of
reciprocity relationships that describe the players attitudes towards each
other. Methodologically speaking, we are thus connected to an infant litera-
ture on games with networks of social preferences (Leider et al. 2009, Bourlès
and Bramoullé 2013). Among other things, our approach demonstrates the
coordinating power of "reciprocity cliques" in a world of non-reciprocal play-
ers and how "reciprocity alienation" can impede coordination.
Our uniqueness results may seem surprising for those who believe that
"in standard examples, the notion of reciprocal preferences tends to increase
the number of equilibria" (Sobel 2005, p. 410). We examine an economically
important class of games that under standard preferences seems intrinsically
plagued with multiple equilibria, yet reciprocity potentially o¤ers a solution.
Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 presents results, on reciprocity
in P&R (3.1) and on reciprocity and cost-sharing (3.2-3). Section 4 explores
welfare, before we conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
We rst recall P&Rs classic participation game. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be
the set of players, with n  3. Player is strategy set is Si = f0; 1g where 1
corresponds to participating in provision and 0 to not doing so. We focus on
pure strategies throughout. Let S = i2NSi. Write s = (s1; s2;:::; sn) for a
prole of strategies.
The threshold number of participants for provision of the public good is
w, where 1 < w < n. Let the cost of participation be x 2 (0; 1) and each
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player receive an additional payo¤ of 1 if the good is provided. Let i be
player is material payo¤ function.
P&R introduce two variants of their game di¤ering in whether or not
costs are refunded when there are fewer than w participants. To dene
payo¤ functions, let m denote the number of players that participate. With
no refunds, player is material payo¤ function is dened by
No Refunds: i (s) =
8>><>>:
1 if m  w and si = 0;
1  x if m  w and si = 1;
0 if m < w and si = 0;
 x if m < w and si = 1.
Any prole where m = 0 or m = w is a Nash equilibrium, and in fact also a
strict equilibrium.
P&R show that refunds imply the ine¢ cient no participation outcome
is no longer a strict equilibrium. With refunds, player is material payo¤
function is dened by
Refunds: i (s) =
8<:
1 if m  w and si = 0;
1  x if m  w and si = 1;
0 if m < w:
While any prole where m = w remains a strict equilibrium, m = 0 doesnt
because deviation to participation would be costless. All strict equilibria are
thus e¢ cient.
We will additionally consider a counterpart to refunds for m > w, cost-
sharing, where costs in excess of the provision cost are returned in equal
shares to the participating players when m > w. Player is material payo¤
function is then dened by
Cost-sharing: i (s) =
8<:
1 if m  w and si = 0;
1  w
m
x if m  w and si = 1;
0 if m < w.
In some contexts cost-sharing is very natural. For instance, in our opening
example 2 workers were needed to be union representatives. Suppose that 4
workers volunteer. Distributing the union tasks between the 4 seems more
reasonable than making all 4 work on every task.
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P&R do not study cost-sharing,2 presumably because it only a¤ects pay-
o¤s whenm > w and such proles are neither equilibria nor attractive proles
to deviate to given the waste involved. Nash and strict equilibria are thus
una¤ected if players are motivated by material payo¤s only. However with
reciprocity motivation cost-sharing will matter.
We next incorporate preferences for reciprocity. Following D&K,3 when
player i plays strategy si and holds point belief bij 2 Sj about player js
strategy, player is kindness to player j is
ij

si; (bij)j 6=i

= j

si; (bij)j 6=i

 1
2

max
s0i
j

s0i; (bij)j 6=i

+min
s0i
j

s0i; (bij)j 6=i

:
If ij (:) > 0 player i is kind to j and if ij (:) < 0 player i is unkind to j.
When player i holds point belief bij about js strategy and (point) belief cijk
about js (point) belief about ks strategy, player is perceived kindness of
player j towards player i is
iji

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

= i

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

 1
2
"
max
b0ij
i

b0ij; (cijk)k 6=j

+min
b0ij
i

b0ij; (cijk)k 6=j
#
:
If iji (:) > 0 player i perceives that j is kind to him... etc. Player is utility
is the sum of his material and reciprocity payo¤s,
Ui

s;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

(1)
= i (s)| {z }
material payo¤
+
X
j2Nnfig

Yij  ij

si; (bij)j 6=i

 iji

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

| {z }
reciprocity payo¤
;
where Yij  0 is is reciprocity sensitivity towards j. If Yij > 0, a preference
for reciprocation is captured by is utility increasing when ij (:) and iji (:)
are non-zero with matching signs.
We now state the two solution concepts we use. Note that we may write
s = (si; s i) where s i is a prole of strategies for all players except i.
2Cost-sharing has however been investigated in related games. For example, Shinohara
(2009) where players have heterogenous valuations of the public good and Makris (2009)
where there is incomplete information over whether or not players are altruistic.
3D&Ks theory of reciprocity applies to a general class of extensive game forms. Our
focus on a specic game a¤ords us two simplications: (i) we need not condition strategies
and beliefs on histories as the game has simultaneous moves; (ii) we need not discuss
D&Ks notion of "ine¢ cient strategies" (p. 276) as all strategies are e¢ cient.
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Denition 1 (SRE) Prole s is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE)
if for all i 2 N
1. Ui

s;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

 Ui

(s0i; s i) ;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

for all s0i,
2. cijk = bjk = sk for all j 6= i and k 6= j.
The rst condition requires that player i is best-responding given others
strategies and his beliefs. The second demands that players hold correct
beliefs. If for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0, then Denition 1 describes a Nash
equilibrium (+ correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payo¤s.
While a unilateral deviation from a SRE cannot increase the deviants
payo¤, such a deviation from a SSRE leads to an actual loss:
Denition 2 (SSRE) Prole s is a strict sequential reciprocity equilibrium
(SSRE) if for all i 2 N
1. Ui

s;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

> Ui

(s0i; s i) ;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

for all s0i,
2. cijk = bjk = sk for all j 6= i and k 6= j.
If for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0, Denition 2 describes a strict equilibrium (+
correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payo¤s.
3 Results
Does reciprocity matter in discrete public good games? The answer is essen-
tially no in P&Rs setting (3.1). The power of reciprocity is unlocked if one
considers cost-sharing, as we show rst relying on examples (3.2) followed by
some formal statements that generalise those examples (3.3).
3.1 Reciprocity in P&R
The following proposition characterises reciprocity equilibria in P&Rs game.
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Proposition 1 (Reciprocity in P&R) (i) With no refunds, the set of
SRE equals the set of SSRE and is independent of Yij. (ii) With refunds,
the set of SSRE is independent of Yij.4
It follows from the proposition, and the insight that P&Rs model may
be seen as the special case where for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0, that P&Rs results
are robust to the incorporation of reciprocity. The intuition is as follows.
Without refunds (i), a single participant cannot unilaterally provide the
good. Given this, equilibrium expectations imply that if no one else partici-
pates, is kindness to j is zero regardless of his participation decision. Hence i
has no reciprocity incentive to participate and the ine¢ cient no-participation
outcome remains an equilibrium despite reciprocity. Furthermore, since de-
viation incurs a material cost, no participation is also a SSRE.
With refunds (ii), the set of SRE does now depend on Yij.5 However,
this is of little relevance to us since reasoning analogous to the previous
paragraph demonstrates the ine¢ cient SRE still exists. We thus have the
same motivation to focus on SSRE in Proposition 1(ii) as P&R had to focus
on strict equilibria. To see that ine¢ cient proles cannot be SSRE, consider
m 6= w. There must be some i whose choice cannot a¤ect othersmaterial
payo¤s. Equilibrium beliefs then imply that is kindness to j is zero and that
either he cannot have a strict best-response, or he has a material incentive
to deviate. All that remains are the e¢ cient proles, m = w.
3.2 Reciprocity & Cost-sharing: Examples
Reciprocity has a potentially dramatic e¤ect under cost-sharing. Not only
does the set of SSRE now depend on Yij, but uniqueness becomes a real
possibility. The coordination problem can thus be solved.
Our results will depend on preferences, specically the distribution of
players reciprocity sensitivities, the "reciprocity network". It is useful to
represent this using weighted directed graphs. Vertices represent players and
their labels correspond to player labels. A directed edge originating from
player is vertex and ending at player js vertex implies Yij > 0. The edge
4All proofs are found in the appendix; we provide only the main intuition in the text.
5For those interested, the set of SRE is a superset of that where for all i; j 2 N ,
Yij = 0. The only di¤erence arises for proles where m = w   1 which are SRE if and
only if non-participants are su¢ ciently reciprocal towards one another.
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label is Yij. Figure 1, for example, represents a 3-player network where for
all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0 except Y12 = Y21 = 5.
1
2 3
55
Figure 1: A reciprocity network
We now dene our rst network notion of reciprocity and illustrate unique-
ness.
Denition 3 (Reciprocity clique of strength ) A set of players L 
N is a reciprocity clique of strength  if for all i; j 2 L, Yij; Yji   > 0.
A reciprocity clique may represent a form of friendship.6 It seems unlikely in
hierarchical relationships such as those between a rm and workers (cf. D&K
2000) but plausible among peers. A su¢ ciently strong reciprocity clique may
overcome the coordination problem as we illustrate in Example 1.
Example 1: Let n = 3, w = 2 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure 1.
Full participation cannot be a SSRE as player 3 would deviate. Only player
3 and one of the clique members participating cannot be either since the
other clique members reciprocity gain from reducing the cost-share of the
participating member is greater than his material cost of participation. This
leaves only the clique participating as the unique SSRE. The coordination
problem is solved.
The existence of a clique is not generally su¢ cient for uniqueness as Ex-
ample 2 will show. The example will also illustrate our second network notion
of reciprocity.
6Reciprocating unkindness is probably not a particularly common feature of enduring
friendships however!
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Denition 4 (Reciprocity alienation) A set of players L  N is reci-
procity alienated if for all i 2 L and all j 2 NnL, Yij = Yji = 0.
Players being reciprocity alienated neither implies nor is implied by them
having selsh preferences. For example, players in L having positive reci-
procity sensitivities towards one another does not contradict alienation; and,
a player not in L with a positive reciprocity sensitivity towards a player in L
implies L is not alienated. Intuitively, the notion implies that players inside
the alienated group provide no reciprocity incentives to those outside the
group and vice-versa.
Our next example adds a non-reciprocal player to Example 1 to illus-
trate the coordination problems caused by alienation and that a clique is not
su¢ cient for coordination.
Example 2: Let n = 4, w = 2 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure
2.
1 2
3 4
5
5
Figure 2: Reciprocity Alienation
Uniqueness is now impossible despite the reciprocity clique. A SSRE with
only 1 and 2 participating exists; however, there also exists one where only
players 3 and 4 participate. Alienation implies there are no reciprocity in-
centives acting across the pairs to break the equilibria.
Although both examples have cliques and multiple sets of alienated play-
ers, there is uniqueness in the rst example and multiplicity in the second.
The di¤erence arises because Example 2 has multiple sets of alienated play-
ers of size w, whereas Example 1 does not. Section 3.3 shows that multiple
alienated sets of this size prevents uniqueness more generally. Example 3
illustrates how a clique can recover uniqueness.
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Example 3: Let n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5 and the reciprocity network be as
in Figure 3.
1 2
3 4
55
2
2
Figure 3: Preventing alienation
Players 3 and 4 only participating is now not a SSRE as player 1(2) has an
incentive to deviate: the gain from reciprocating the kindness of player 3(4)
is greater than the material cost. All proles except where only the clique
participate can be excluded, uniqueness thus re-emerges.
Example 3 illustrates how a clique being reciprocal towards non-clique
players avoids alienation and can imply uniqueness. Section 3.3 shows how
general reciprocity networks with this property may achieve coordination.
The nal example concerns networks with high reciprocity sensitivities.
Given that multiple equilibria exist with standard preferences one may con-
jecture that su¢ ciently high reciprocity sensitivity solves the coordination
problem. This is not necessarily true, however.
Example 4: Let n = 4, x = 0:5 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure
4.
1 2
3 4
Yij 13
Figure 4: High reciprocity sensitivity
Consider two cases, rst w = 3. Three participants cannot be a SSRE as the
non-participant deviates since his reciprocity gain from doing so outweighs
10
his material cost. Full participation is the unique SSRE. Now suppose w = 2
and 3 players are participating. Participants have no incentive to deviate as
their reciprocity gain from reciprocating the kindness of fellow participants is
greater than the material cost. Non-participants do not deviate either since
equilibrium beliefs imply a particular participants kindness towards them is
zero. Thus, there are multiple SSRE.
More generally high reciprocity gives uniqueness if and only if w = n  1;
see Section 3.3. Example 4 also illustrates that there may be more than w
participants in a unique SSRE. We show that any number between w and n
can be consistent with uniqueness in the next section.
To summarise the insights from Examples 1-4.
1. Existence of a unique SSRE is possible with cost-sharing and reciprocity
(Examples 1, 3 and 4).
2. Reciprocity alienation can prevent uniqueness (Example 2).
3. A su¢ ciently strong reciprocity clique with positive reciprocity sensi-
tivities towards players outside the clique can imply a unique SSRE
(Example 3).
4. High reciprocity sensitivities do not necessarily imply uniqueness or
multiplicity of SSRE (Example 4).
Readers looking mainly for key intuitions exhibited by typical examples
may now skip to Section 4. Readers interested in seeing some more general
formal statements, plus further details, should continue to Section 3.3.
3.3 Reciprocity & Cost-sharing: Details
First we describe the SSRE of our model. For strategy prole s, letM denote
the associated set of participating players and m be the cardinality of M .
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Proposition 2 (Cost-sharing equilibria) With cost-sharing, all SSRE in-
volve provision of the public good. Prole s where m = w is a SSRE if and
only if for all i 2M ,
1  x+ (1  x)
2
2
X
j2Mnfig
Yij >
x
2 (w + 1)
X
j2NnM
Yij, (2)
and for all i 2 NnM , X
j2M
Yij < 2w: (3)
Prole s where m > w is a SSRE if and only if for all i 2M ,X
j2Mnfig
Yij >
2m (m  1)2
wx
. (4)
Proposition 2 states that m  w in all SSRE, consistent with refunds
ruling out proles with m < w (Section 3.1). The conditions for a SSRE
withm = w are understood as follows. Participant non-deviation (2) requires
that the gain from reciprocating the kindness of other participants and the
material gain from provision be greater than the loss of not reciprocating the
unkindness of non-participants. Non-participant non-deviation (3) demands
the material savings be greater than the reciprocity cost of not reciprocating
participant kindness. As non-participants cannot a¤ect each others material
payo¤s they provide no reciprocity incentives to one another.
For a SSRE with m > w a non-deviation condition is not needed for
non-participants as they have no incentive to deviate: each non-participant
believes other players believed they could not inuence his material payo¤.
Participant non-deviation (4) requires the gain from reciprocating the kind-
ness of fellow participants be greater than the material cost.
Note that Proposition 2 does not guarantee existence of SSRE. To see
one instance of non-existence suppose that for all i; j 2 N , Yij  2w, so that
(3) does not hold. Then take x su¢ ciently small such that (4) does not hold.
Cliques Coordinating a Selsh World
Examples 1 and 3 demonstrated the potential of a reciprocity cliques to
coordinate behaviour. The next two results describe a fairly rich set of cir-
cumstances where this is true.
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Proposition 3 (Clique with w members) Suppose that all players have
selsh preferences except a reciprocity cliqueM 0 of strength  > maxf0; 2[wx (n  w) 
(1  x) (w + 1)]= (w2   1) (1  x)2g with jM 0j = w, and that for all i 2 M 0
and j 2 NnM 0, Yij = 2w. In this case there exists a unique SSRE prole s
where M =M 0.
The proposition generalises Example 3: a su¢ ciently strong clique with
w members and positive reciprocity sensitivity towards non-clique players (to
avoid alienation) can coordinate behaviour in a selsh world. See Example
3 for the intuition.
We have seen examples of coordination by cliques with w members (Ex-
amples 1 and 3, Proposition 3) and n members (Example 4) participating,
but can cliques of other sizes coordinate behaviour and provide the good in
a selsh world? The following proposition provides an answer.
Proposition 4 (Clique with > w members) Suppose that all players have
selsh preferences except M 00 = f1; 2; :::;m00g where m00 > w. Also sup-
pose that for all i 2 Mnfm00g, Yi(i+1) = Ym001 = 1 + 2[m00 (m00   1)2  
w (m00   2) (w + 1)]=wx, that for all k 2M 00nfi; i+ 1g and l 2M 00nf1;m00g,
Yik = Ym00l = 2 (w + 1) =x, and that for all i 2 M 00and j 2 NnM 00, Yij = 2.
In this case there exists a unique SSRE prole s where M =M 00.
Note that M 00 is a reciprocity clique, however unlike that in Proposition
3 this clique has heterogenous intra-clique reciprocity sensitivities. To see
the necessity of this, consider a clique of size m > w + 1 with homogenous
intra-clique reciprocity sensitivities. The level of reciprocity required for a
SSRE with the entire clique participating is more than that required for a
SSRE with a proper subset of the clique providing the good (condition (4)).
Uniqueness is thus incompatible with the entire clique providing.
By contrast, a clique with heterogenous reciprocity sensitivities can co-
ordinate behaviour and provide the good as stated in Proposition 4. Each
clique member is relatively reciprocal to all other players, but is strongly
reciprocal towards one other clique member towards whom no-one else is
strongly reciprocal. A proper subset of the clique providing the good now
cannot be an equilibrium as at least one participant will not have his strongly
reciprocal player participating and thus he has an incentive to deviate.
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Coordination Di¢ culties
Our insights on reciprocity cliques may make coordination seem easy. In
general, however, coordination via reciprocity networks is far from trivial.
We have already noted equilibrium existence problems. Here follow three
negative observations of reciprocity networks where instead the coordination
problem is very much alive, beginning with alienation.
Observation 1 (Reciprocity alienation) If there exist two sets of reci-
procity alienated players L0 and L00, such that L0 6= L00and jL0j = jL00j = w,
then there are multiple SSRE.
To see the logic behind the statement, simply note that provision by an
alienated group of size w is a SSRE and multiplicity follows immediately if
there are two such groups (e.g. Example 2).
Having reciprocity incentives throughout the set of players is clearly im-
portant to avoid this outcome. The conditions in Observation 1 are satised
more easily than it may seem. For example, at least w + 1 players with
standard preferences towards whom no-one is reciprocal is su¢ cient. Su¢ -
ciently high reciprocity among all players is however not enough to prevent
multiplicity as our next observation shows.
Observation 2 (High reciprocity) If for all i; j 2 N , Yij > 2 (w + 1) =x,
then there exists a unique SSRE if and only if w = n  1.
To see this, reason as follows. When w = n   1 candidate SSRE with
m = w are broken as non-participants have an incentive to reciprocate the
kindness of participants (3), leaving only a SSRE with m = n, (2). When
w < n  1, (4) implies existence of a SSRE with m = w + 1 is guaranteed if
for all i; j 2 N , Yij > 2 (w + 1) =x, however there are many such equilibria
(see e.g. Example 4).
A direct implication of Observation 2 is that for a high reciprocity net-
work, provision of a public good which requires almost full participation may
be easier than one that requires low participation. Our next observation
points out low participation public goods are also more di¢ cult to provide
when preferences are homogenous.
Observation 3 (Homogenous reciprocity) If w < n 1 and for all i; j 2
N , Yij = Y , then there exist multiple SSRE.
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To see the logic, reason as follows. With homogenous preferences a unique
SSRE cannot have less than n participants otherwise another SSRE would
exist where at least one participant and non-participant exchange strate-
gies. Furthermore, full participation cannot be a unique SSRE since the
level of reciprocity required for equilibrium is increasing in the number of
participants, (4), so there would also exist equilibria with fewer participants.
Preference heterogeneity is thus often key to coordination via reciprocity
networks.
4 Welfare
We have so far implicitly dened e¢ ciency in terms of material payo¤s. This
is not obvious given that utility functions are assumed to be a combination
of both material and reciprocity payo¤s. While some scholars have argued
that welfare should be dened on full utility functions (e.g. Rabin 1993, p.
1294), more generally the jury remains out on whether non-material payo¤s in
social preference models should be included in normative analysis (Bernheim
& Rangel 2005).
To illustrate one problem with including reciprocity payo¤s in e¢ ciency
denitions, recall P&R with neither refunds nor cost-sharing. Let n = 4,
w = 2, x = 0:5, player 1 be alienated and the others form a clique of
strength 3. Including reciprocity payo¤s in e¢ ciency implies player 1 only
participating is e¢ cient as clique members get strictly lower utility in all
other proles due to the absence of unkindness reciprocation. Reciprocation
of unkindness hardly seems "normatively desirable".
A more thorough examination of whether and how one should incorporate
reciprocity payo¤s into welfare criteria is clearly beyond the scope of our
paper. Nonetheless, we now explain the main implications of dening Pareto
e¢ ciency on full utility functions in our game.
With neither refunds nor cost-sharing it remains the case that the w
participant SRE is Pareto superior to the no-participation SRE: all players
receive strictly higher material payo¤s and participants reciprocate kindness
towards one another, so receive strictly higher reciprocity payo¤s.
Although the ine¢ ciency problem remains, P&Rs refunds may no longer
recover e¢ ciency. For example, take P&R with only a refund, let n = 3,
w = 2, x = 0:5 and all Yij = 0 except Y21 > 8. Despite players 1 and 2 only
participating and players 1 and 3 only participating both being SSRE, the
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former now Pareto dominates the latter as 1 receives the same utility and 2
and 3 receive higher utility.
While the set of SSRE may be (partially) Pareto rankable, transitivity
of the Pareto criterion implies that there exists some SSRE undominated by
other SSRE. This SSRE is in fact e¢ cient overall: if m < w 1, participants
in the SSRE are now worse o¤, and if m = w   1, participants in the SSRE
who are now non-participants are worse o¤.
In Section 3 the set of e¢ cient proles was xed and the reciprocity
network determined equilibrium behaviour. With reciprocity included in
the e¢ ciency denition, the reciprocity network simultaneously determines
which strategy proles are e¢ cient and equilibrium behaviour. Is a unique
and e¢ cient SSRE still attainable with cost-sharing?
Recall Example 3 from Section 3.3 to see that the answer is yes. Example
3: n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5 and for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0 except Y13 = Y24 = 5
and Y12 = Y21 = 2, implying a unique SSRE with the clique participating.
This is e¢ cient since any other prole either involves non-provision or player
3 and/or 4 participating, hence player 3 and/or 4 being strictly worse o¤.
Since Proposition 3 is established by generalising the logic of this example,
a unique and e¢ cient SSRE remains possible.
5 Conclusion
Societies around the world have faced and continue to face great challenges.
A fundamental prerequisite to overcome many of these is the coordination
of social participation. Palfrey & Rosenthal (1984) (P&R) provided an ade-
quate and specic framework for exploring related issues: discrete-level public
goods games, which capture the key problems of private provision of public
goods in condensed form.
Reciprocity is an important form of human motivation which many schol-
ars have suggested may matter in public goods provision settings. We have
explored how the application of a formal model of reciprocity (Dufwenberg
& Kirchsteiger 2004; cf. Rabin 1993) a¤ects predictions in P&Rs context,
with extensions.
A new potential source of coordination power was uncovered: the net-
works of reciprocity incentives embedded amongst citizens. These incentives,
however, coordinate behaviour only if two key ingredients are present. The
rst is cost-sharing. Since cost-sharing can potentially be manipulated by
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institution designers, understanding its e¤ects seems particularly important.
While there is some experimental work in continuous contribution games
(Marks & Croson 1998, Spencer et al. 2009), the conditions under which
cost-sharing can coordinate behaviour are poorly understood. Our work sug-
gests that empirical exploration of its interaction with reciprocity may be
worthwhile.
The second key ingredient we identied for coordination is the nature of
the reciprocity network. Properties of the network can both help coordination
and hinder it. We are then left with a pressing empirical question: what does
the reciprocity network look like in reality? Given its importance and the
absence of empirical research on its nature, addressing this may be of interest
for public good scholars.
Societies will probably always have new challenges waiting for them. We
hope that by understanding how social participation can be coordinated,
resolutions are less of a struggle, leaving more time to enjoy the public goods
produced.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (Reciprocity in P&R)
(i) No refunds. Identify the set of SRE and the set of SSRE, to prove that
they are equal and independent of Yij. First consider a candidate equilib-
rium strategy prole with no participants. Deviation gives i a strictly lower
material payo¤ given w > 1 and does not a¤ect his reciprocity payo¤ since
for all i, j and si, ij(si; s i) = 0. Thus non-participation is a SRE and a
SSRE. Second, consider a candidate equilibrium prole with w participants.
Deviation gives i a strictly lower material payo¤ and no increase in reci-
procity payo¤. More specically, the reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged for i
such that si = 0 since for all si and j, ij(si; s i) = 0; and, is strictly lower
for i such that si = 1 since for all j such that sj = 1, iji(1; s j) > 0 and
ij(1; s i) > ij(0; s i), and for all j such that sj = 0, iji(0; s j) = 0. Thus
w participants is a SRE and a SSRE. To see that there are no more equilib-
ria, consider a candidate equilibrium prole with any number of participants
other than 0 or w. Deviation gives i such that si = 1 a strictly higher ma-
terial payo¤ and leaves his reciprocity payo¤ unchanged given that for all j
and si, ij (si; s i) = 0. Thus these proles are neither SRE nor SSRE.
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(ii) Refunds. Identify the set of SSRE to prove that it is independent of Yij.
Consider a candidate SSRE prole with w participants. Deviation gives i
a strictly lower material payo¤ and no increase in reciprocity payo¤. More
specically, i such si = 0 receives an identical reciprocity payo¤ since for
all j and si, ij(si; s i) = 0; and, i such that si = 1 receives a strictly
lower reciprocity payo¤ since for j such that sj = 1, iji(1; s j) > 0 and
ij(1; s i) > ij(0; s i), and for j such that sj = 0, iji(0; s j) = 0. Thus w
participants is a SSRE. To see that there are no more SSRE, rst consider
a candidate SSRE prole with more than w participants. Deviation by i
such that si = 1 increases his material payo¤ and gives identical reciprocity
payo¤ given that for all j, iji (sj; s j) = 0. Thus this prole is not a SSRE.
Second, consider a candidate SSRE prole with a number of participants
strictly between zero and w. Deviation by i such that si = 1 gives identical
material and reciprocity payo¤s since for all si and j, ij(si; s i) = 0. Thus
this prole is not SSRE. Finally, consider the candidate SSRE prole with no
participants. Deviation gives identical material and reciprocity payo¤s since
for all si and j, ij(si; s i) = 0. Thus this prole is not SSRE. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (Cost-sharing equilibria)
First show that non-provision proles cannot be SSRE. Consider a candidate
SSRE prole with no participants. Deviation gives i the same material and
reciprocity payo¤s since for all si and j, ij(si; s i) = 0. Thus this is not
SSRE. Consider a candidate SSRE prole with a number of participants
strictly between 0 and w. Deviation by i such that si = 1 gives him the same
material and reciprocity payo¤s since for all si and j, ij(si; s i) = 0. Thus
this is not SSRE.
Then identify conditions for provision proles to be SSRE. A SSRE prole
withw participants requires that for all i such that si = 1, ui((1; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)) >
ui((0; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)), implying (2), and that for all i such that si = 0,
ui((0; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)) > ui((1; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)), implying (3). In a
SSRE prole with strictly more than w participants, deviation by i such that
si = 0 reduces his material payo¤and leaves his reciprocity payo¤unchanged
since for all j, iji(sj; s j) = 0 . Thus a SSRE requires only that for all i
such that si = 1, ui((1; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)) > ui((0; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)),
implying (4). 
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Proof of Proposition 3 (Clique with w members)
Recall the reciprocity network in the proposition: take M 0  N such that
jM 0j = w and (a) for all i 2 NnM 0 and j 2 N , let Yij = 0 , (b) for
all i 2 M 0 and j 2 NnM 0, let Yij = 2w, and (c) for all i; j 2 M 0 let
Yij > maxf0; 2[wx (n  w)  (1  x) (w + 1)]= (w2   1) (1  x)2g. Reason as
follows to see that there is a unique SSRE. First consider a candidate SSRE
prole with more than w participants. There must exist some i 2 NnM 0 such
that si = 1. But then for such i, (a) implies the LHS of the inequality in (4)
is equal to zero. Thus this is not a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate SSRE
prole with w participants where the set of participants is not equal to M 0.
There must exist some i 2 M 0 such that si = 0 and some j 2 NnM 0 such
that sj = 1. But then for such i, (b) implies the LHS of the inequality in (3)
equals 2w. Thus this is not SSRE. Consider the only remaining candidate
SSRE where the set of participants equals M 0. For all i 2 M 0 inequality (2)
is satied given (b) and (c). The inequality in (3) is satised given (a). Thus
this is the unique SSRE. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (Clique with > w members)
Recall the reciprocity network in the proposition: take M 00 = f1; 2; :::;m00g
where jM 00j = m00 > w and (d) for all i 2 Mnfm00g let Yi(i+1) = Ym001 =
1 + 2[m00 (m00   1)2   w (m00   2) (w + 1)]=wx, (e) for all k 2 M 00nfi; i + 1g
and l 2 M 00nfm00; 1g, let Yik = Ym00l = 2 (w + 1) =x, (f) for all i 2 M 00
and j 2 NnM 00, let Yij = 2w, and (g) for all i 2 NnM 00 and j 2 N , let
Yij = 0. Reason as follows to see that there is a unique SSRE. First consider
a candidate SSRE where the set of participants is a proper subset ofM 00 with
strictly more than w participants. Given (e) there must be some i 2M 00 such
that si = 1 and for all j for whom sj = 1, Yij = 2 (w + 1) =x. But then for
such i, inequality (4) does not hold. Thus this is not SSRE. Second, consider
a candidate SSRE where there are strictly more than w participants and the
set of participants is not a subset of M 00. There must be some i 2 NnM 00
such that si = 1. But then for such i, inequality (4) does not hold given (g).
Thus this is not SSRE. Third, consider a candidate SSRE prole where there
are w participants. There must exist some i 2M 00 such that si = 0. But then
for such i, inequality (3) does not hold given (d), (e) and (f). Thus this is
not SSRE. The nal candidate SSRE prole is where the set of participants
is M 00. Inequality (4) holds given (d) and (e). This is the unique SSRE. 
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